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11 Introduction
Many studies have shown that real activity in developed countries displays common char-
acteristics, see Del Negro and Otrok (2008), Giannone and Reichlin (2006) and Canova et
al. (2007) among others. There is also mounting evidence that the characteristics of real
cyclical ￿ uctuations are changing over time. For example, Bayoumi and Helbling (2003)
￿nd that synchronization of OECD cycles increased after 2000; Stock and Watson (2003)
highlight changes in the volatility of G-7 cycles in the 1990s, and Canova et al. (2007)
document variations in the correlation structure of G-7 ￿ uctuations since the late 1980s.
Why are the cyclical features of industrialized economies changing? Three possibilities
come to mind. It could be that variations in structural features have altered the transmis-
sion of shocks within and across countries. For instance, changes in the preferences of the
monetary authority have been often invoked to explain the ￿Great in￿ ation￿of the 1970s
and the subsequent period of a more stable and predictable macroeconomic environment
in the US and other countries (see e.g. Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004, or Cogley and Sar-
gent, 2005). An alternative possibility is that the characteristics and the frequency of the
shocks hitting developed economies have dramatically changed. Sims and Zha (2006) and
Canova and Gambetti (2009) among others, argued that changes in the volatility of macro-
economic shocks could be responsible for changes in the volatility and in the persistence
of output and in￿ ation in the US; Stock and Watson (2003) suggested that changes in the
shock volatility a⁄ected the magnitude of the international correlation of macroeconomic
variables; and Bayoumi and Helbling (2003) claimed that common shocks are now more
frequent than used to be. Finally, institutional changes may have altered the nature of
cyclical ￿ uctuations. Thus, the same type of shocks and the same policies could have had
di⁄erent repercussions because the environment in which they took place has changed. To
the best of our knowledge, this last option has received little attention in the literature.
This seems an important shortcoming since, at least in Europe, the institutional setting
has dramatically changed over the last 20 years ￿the Maastricht treaty implemented, the
European Central Bank created, the Euro introduced. The recent sovereign debt crisis
2has created expectations of further institutional changes which may alter the transmission
of shocks in Euro area countries, the propagation between Euro area and non-Euro area
countries, and in general, the way business cycles shape.
Several reasons may explain why the literature has largely neglected the topic. In-
stitutions typically change slowly making it di¢ cult to select subsamples over which to
compare cyclical ￿ uctuations; variations of this type may a⁄ect cycles with much longer
periodicity than the ones typically associated with business ￿ uctuations (see e.g. earlier
work by Alesina, 1988, or Ball, 2011); externalities and threshold e⁄ects may matter and
long delays make their quantitative importance di¢ cult to measure in small samples. Fi-
nally, institutional changes hardly come in a vacuum and this makes it particularly di¢ cult
to attribute observed variations to these factors.
This paper sheds some light on the issue by focusing on the consequences that the
Maastricht treaty, the creation of the ECB and the Euro changeover had for European
real cyclical ￿ uctuations. The investigation is relevant from, at least, three di⁄erent per-
spectives. First, since these changes were brought about by politicians and were, to a large
extent, exogenous with respect to the dynamics of the European economies, the experience
is unique to verify some well-known implications of the common currency area literature.
For example, does real convergence precede the establishment of common monetary insti-
tutions or the reverse holds true? Second, two of the events are monetary in nature. The
ability of monetary factors to a⁄ect real variables at business cycle frequencies has been
extensively studied and limited e⁄ects typically found. However, the events we consider
are di⁄erent from those typically examined in the literature and their consequences a-priori
comparable to the establishment of the Fed or the breakdown of the gold standard, which
did a⁄ect cyclical ￿ uctuations (see e.g. Bergman, et al., 1998). Third, in macroeconomic
analyses it is common to separate business cycles from other types of ￿ uctuations claiming
that the mechanism generating the two types of movements is di⁄erent. If institutional
changes, besides a⁄ecting medium-long run tendencies, also exercise an impact on the
business cycle, such a practice should be reconsidered.
Since the subject is largely unexplored, we focus attention to two somewhat narrow
3questions. Has there been any tendency for European and national cycles to vary when
these institutional changes took place? Is there any di⁄erence in the relative impact that
the institutional reforms had on the cyclical characteristics of the data?
To study these questions we employ a panel VAR model of the type developed in
Canova and Ciccarelli (2009). The setup is useful because i) it handles large scale models
displaying unit speci￿c dynamics and cross country lagged interdependencies; ii) it ￿ exibly
allows for time variations in the correlation structure across variables and units; and iii) it
features an index structure, where the distribution of European, Euro area and national
speci￿c cyclical indicators can recursively be constructed. Since our sample of countries
includes both Euro area and non-Euro countries, we have a natural control group which
helps us to strengthen our conclusions about the relevance of the creation of the ECB and
the Euro changeover for European cyclical ￿ uctuations.
The features of European and national cycles have changed over time. For instance, we
detect volatility changes, variations in the persistence of the ￿ uctuations of both European
and national cycles, and a higher conformity between national and European ￿ uctuations
since 1990. Furthermore, there has been an intensi￿cation of the links, both within Europe,
and between Europe and the US, and shocks are now ￿ more￿common than in the past.
However, these variations either predate or are disconnected with the events of interest,
and are shared by Euro area and non-Euro area countries. In addition, our model predicts
the pattern of output growth ￿ uctuations well after the creation of the ECB and the Euro
changeover, suggesting that these two events did not produce clean breaks in the dynamics
of real variables. Thus, time variations in the features and the transmission of cyclical
￿ uctuations appear to be linked more to the general process of European convergence
taking place since the mid-1980s than to the institutional changes we consider.
While the evidence is not very supportive, one should be careful in drawing the con-
clusion that the institutional events have no e⁄ects on the real ￿ uctuations. Our study
examines only demeaned, standardized business cycles ￿ uctuations; thus, e⁄ects on the
level or the volatility could be present. Medium term (say, 8 and 12 years) cycles could
also be in￿ uenced. Moreover, while not directly linked to business cycle variations, in-
4stitutional changes could have indirectly contributed to solidify on-going tendencies, for
example, by making the environment more predictable or better insulating the real econ-
omy from undesirable nominal shocks. These issues are interesting but, to quantify their
importance, a more structural model needs to be employed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the model, the
technique used to construct the indicators and interesting statistics. Section 3 presents the
data and some speci￿cation analysis. Section 4 contains the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The empirical model
The empirical model we employ has the form:
yit = Dit(L)Yt￿1 + Fit(L)Wt + eit (1)
where i = 1;:::;N refers to countries and t = 1;:::;T to time; yit is a G ￿ 1 vector for
each i, Yt = (y0
1t;y0
2t;:::y0
Nt)0; Dit;j are G￿NG matrices for each lag j = 1;:::;p, Wt is a
M ￿1 vector of exogenous variables, Fit;j are G￿M matrices each lag j = 0;1;:::;q ￿1;
and eit is a G ￿ 1 vector of random disturbances.
The model displays three important ingredients which makes it ideal for our purposes.
First, coe¢ cients are allowed to vary over time. Without this feature, smooth changes
in business cycle features could be mistakenly attributed to the once-and-for-all institu-
tional changes we are concerned with. Second, the dynamic relationships are allowed to
be unit speci￿c. Without such a ￿ exibility, heterogeneity biases may be present, and
economic conclusions could be easily distorted. Third, whenever the NG ￿ NG matrix
Dt(L) = [D1t(L);:::;DNt(L)]0, is not block diagonal for some L, cross-unit lagged in-
terdependencies matter. Thus, dynamic feedbacks across units are allowed for and this
greatly expands the type of interactions the model can account for.
While these ingredients add realism to the speci￿cation and avoid the short-cuts that
the literature has often taken (see Canova and Ciccarelli, 2009, for discussion), they are
not costless: the number of parameters is large (there are k = NGp + Mq parameters in
each equation) and there is only one time period per unit to estimate them. For estimation
5purposes, it is convenient to rewrite (1) in a simultaneous equations format:
Yt = Zt￿t + Et (2)
where Zt = ING￿X0
t; X0






t￿q), ￿t = (￿0
1t;:::;￿0
Nt)0
and ￿it are Gk￿1 vectors containing, stacked, the G rows of the matrix Dit and Fit, while
Yt and Et are NG ￿ 1 vectors. Since ￿t varies with cross￿ sectional units in di⁄erent time
periods, it is impossible to estimate it using unrestricted classical methods. However,
even if ￿t were time invariant, its sheer dimensionality prevents any meaningful uncon-
strained estimation. To overcome this problem we assume that ￿t depends on a much
lower dimension vector ￿t and posit the following linear structure:
￿t = ￿1￿1t + ￿2￿2t + ￿3￿3t + ￿4￿4t + ut (3)
where ￿1; ￿2; ￿3;￿4 are matrices of dimensions NGk￿s, NGk￿N, NGk￿G, NGk￿1
respectively and ￿it;i = 1;:::;4 are mutually orthogonal. Here ￿1t captures movements
in the coe¢ cient vector which are common across countries and variables (or groups of
them) and is of dimension s; ￿2t captures movements in the coe¢ cient vector which are
common within countries and its dimension equals to N; ￿3t captures movements in the
coe¢ cient vector which are variable speci￿c and its dimension is equal to G; ￿4t is a scalar
process which captures movements in the coe¢ cients due to the M exogenous variables.
Finally, ut captures all the unmodeled features of the coe¢ cient vector, which may have
to do with lag speci￿c, time speci￿c or other idiosyncratic e⁄ects.
Factoring ￿t as in (3) is advantageous in many respects. Computationally, it reduces
the problem of estimating NGk coe¢ cients into the one of estimating s + N + G + 1
factors characterizing their dynamics. Practically, the factorization (3) transforms an
overparameterized panel VAR into a parsimonious SUR model, where the regressors are




Zit￿it + vt (4)
where Zit = Zt￿i capture respectively, common, country speci￿c, variable speci￿c and
exogenous speci￿c information present in the data, and vt = Et + Ztut. Economically,
6the decomposition in (4) conveniently allows us to measure the relative importance of
common and country speci￿c in￿ uences for ￿ uctuations in Yt and thus to examine whether
institutional events a⁄ect them di⁄erently. In fact, WLIt = Z1t￿1t plays the role of a
common indicator, while CLIt = Z2t￿2t plays the role of a vector of country speci￿c
indicators. Note that WLIt and CLIt are correlated ￿a portion of the variables in Z1t
also enter in Z2t ￿but the correlation tends to zero as N increases.
To illustrate the structure of the Zjt￿ s suppose there are G = 2 variables, N = 2












































































5 + et (5)

































2;2;t;]0 is a 16 ￿ 1 vector and the typical element of ￿t, ￿
i;j
l;s;t, is indexed
by the country i, the variable j, the variable in an equation l (independent of the country),
and the country in an equation s (independent of variable). If we are not interested in
modelling all these aspects, one possible factorization of ￿t is
￿t = ￿1￿1t + ￿2￿2t + ￿3￿3t + ut (6)
where ut captures unaccounted features, and for each t, ￿1t is a scalar, ￿2t is a 2￿1 vector,
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5￿3t + vt (7)




t￿1 + 1, Z2;1;t = y1
t￿1 + x1





t￿1, Z3;2;t = x1
t￿1 + x2
t￿1 and vt = et + Z0
tut.
As the notation used makes it clear, the regressors in (4) are combinations of lags of the
right hand side variables of the VAR, while ￿it are time varying loadings. Using averages
as regressors is common in the factor model literature (see e.g. Stock and Watson, 1989,
or Forni and Reichlin, 1998) and in the signal extraction literature (see e.g. Sargent,
1989). Two important di⁄erences between (4) and standard factor models need to be
noted. First, the indicators equally weight the information in all variables. The equal
weighting scheme comes directly from (3) and the fact that all variables are measured in
the same units (all variables will be demeaned and standardized). Second, our indices are
observable and dynamically span lagged interdependencies across countries and variables.
2.1 The complete model
To complete the speci￿cation we need additional assumptions. First, we assume that
Et ￿ N (0;￿). Thus, we do not allow for time variations in the variance of the shocks of the
original panel VAR. Nevertheless, as it will be clear below, our model can capture volatility
changes in the reduced form disturbances. Second, we assume that ut ￿ N(0;￿￿V ) where
V is a k ￿ k matrix. Third, letting ￿t = [￿1t;:::;￿4t]0 we specify
￿t = ￿t￿1 + ￿t ￿t ￿ N (0;Bt): (8)
where Bt is block diagonal and let Et, ut and ￿t be mutually independent.
In (8) the factors evolve over time as random walks. This assumption is common
in the time varying coe¢ cient VAR literature (see e.g. Canova and Gambetti, 2009), is
parsimonious and typically preferred to more complicated structure in forecasting sense
and allows us to focus on coe¢ cient changes which are permanent. The variance of ￿t is
allowed to be time varying to account for ARCH-M type e⁄ects and other generic volatility
clustering that may appear in Yt. The block diagonality of Bt guarantees orthogonality of
the factors, which is preserved a-posteriori, and hence their identi￿ability. Finally, both
8the choice of making the errors independent and the covariance matrix of ut proportional
to ￿ are standard in hierarchical models (see e.g. Kadiyala and Karlsson, 1997).
Two other comments are in order. First, we parameterize V = ￿2Ik to re￿ ect the
fact that the factors have similar units and use ￿2 to optimize the setup. Second, we
allow for time variations in the variance of ￿t, rather than in the variance of Et, because
computational costs are reduced (in our application, Bt is just a 4 ￿ 1 vector rather than
a 60 ￿ 1 vector). We set Bt = ￿1 ￿ Bt￿1 + ￿2 ￿ ￿ B, and search for values of ￿1;￿2 to
maximize the ￿t of the model. Thus, while we will use Bayesian methods to construct
posterior distributions of the quantity of interest, we reduce the complexity of problem
by treating some parameters as ￿xed, as in empirical Bayes analysis, and optimize them
using ML-type II methods (see e.g. Canova, 2007). It turns out that the optimal value of
￿1 is very small, making Bt e⁄ectively constant.
2.2 Priors and Posteriors
To compute posterior distributions, we assume prior densities for ￿0 = (￿￿1; ￿ B;￿0).
We set ￿ Bi = bi ￿ I; i = 1;:::;4, where bi controls the tightness of factor i in the
coe¢ cients, and make p(￿￿1;bi;￿0) = p(￿￿1)
Q






and p(￿0 j F￿1) = N
￿￿ ￿0; ￿ R0
￿
where N stands for Normal, W for
Wishart and IG for Inverse Gamma distributions, and F￿1 denotes the information avail-
able at time ￿1. The prior for ￿0 and the law of motion for the factors imply that
p(￿t j Ft￿1) = N
￿￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1; ￿ Rt￿1jt￿1 + Bt
￿
.
We collect the hyperparameters of the prior in the vector ￿ = (z1;Q1;$0;S0;￿ ￿0; ￿ R0).
Values for the elements of ￿ are either obtained from the data (this is the case for ￿ ￿0;Q1)
to tune up the prior to the application or a-priori selected to produce relatively loose
priors (this is the case for z1;$0;S0; ￿ R0). The values used are: z1 = N ￿ G + 5;Q1 =
^ Q1;$0 = 106;S0 = 1:0;￿ ￿0 = ^ ￿0 and ￿ R0 = I4. Here ^ Q1 is a block diagonal matrix
^ Q1 = diag (Q11;:::;Q1N) and Q1i is the estimated covariance matrix of the time invariant
version for country i VAR; ^ ￿0 is obtained with an OLS regression on a time invariant
version of (1) over the entire sample. Note that by setting $0 = 106 we impose a tight
9prior on time variation. We test this speci￿cation against a looser alternative in section 3.
To calculate the posterior distribution for ￿ = (￿￿1;bi;f￿tgT
t=1), we combine the prior










0 ￿￿1 (Yt ￿ Zt￿￿t)
#
(9)
where Y T = (Y1;:::;YT) denotes the data. Using Bayes rule, p
￿






Y T j ￿
￿
. Once these distributions are found, location and dispersion measures for
any interesting continuous functions h(￿) can be obtained.
Since it is impossible to compute p
￿
￿ j Y T￿
analytically, a Gibbs sampler is used to
draw sequences from the posterior. Denoting ￿￿￿ the vector ￿ excluding the parameter
￿, the conditional distributions needed in the Gibbs sampler are
￿t j Y T;￿￿￿t ￿ N
￿￿ ￿tjT; ￿ RtjT
￿
t ￿ T;
































where ￿ ￿tjT and ￿ RtjT are the smoothed one-period ahead forecasts of ￿t and of the variance-
covariance matrix of the forecast error calculated as in Chib and Greenberg (1995), $i =
K + $0, and K = Ts, if i = 1;K = Tg, if i = 2;K = TN, if i = 3;K = T, if i = 4.
Under regularity conditions (see Geweke, 2000), cycling through the distributions in
(10) produces in the limit draws from the joint posterior of interest. From these, the mar-
ginal distributions of ￿t can be computed averaging over draws in the nuisance dimensions
and, as a by-product, the posterior distributions of our indicators can be obtained. For
example, a credible 90% interval for the common indicator is obtained ordering the draws
of WLIh
t for each t and taking the 5th and the 95th percentile of the distribution. We have
performed standard convergence checks: increasing the length of the chain; splitting the
chains in pieces after a burn-in period and calculating whether the mean and the variances
are similar; checking if cumulative means settle to some value. The results we present are
10based on 150000 draws: 3000 blocks of 50 draws were made and the last draw for each
block is retained. Of these, 2000 draws are used for posterior inference at each t.
2.3 Summary Statistics
Besides characterizing the time pro￿le of the posterior distribution of interesting cyclical
indicators, we will be interested in computing predictive distributions for Yt+￿; ￿ = 1;2;
:::, which is given by f(Yt+￿) =
R
f(Yt+￿jYt;￿t+￿)g(￿t+￿jYt)d￿t+￿; and t varies. These
distributions can be obtained numerically using the structure of the model and draws for
the posterior of the parameters and/or the shocks. To draw from this predictive densities,
we condition on ￿t+￿ = ￿t.
We will also be interested in computing the dynamic response of the endogenous vari-
ables to shocks in di⁄erent samples. Since the model is intrinsically non-linear, we compute
responses as the di⁄erence between two conditional forecasts: one where a particular vari-
able (or set of variables) is shocked and one where the disturbance is set to zero. Formally,




a collection of future observations and ￿t+￿
t+1 = [￿0
t+1;:::￿0
t+￿]0 a collection of future trajecto-




t], where v1t are the shocks to the
endogenous variables and v2t the shocks to exogenous variables. Let ￿￿
j;t+1 be a realization






be two conditioning sets, where ￿￿j;t indicates all shocks, excluding the one in the j-th
component and Jt is an identi￿cation matrix satisfying JtJ0
t = ￿. Then, responses at
horizon ￿ to an impulse in ￿￿
j;t, j = 1;::: are
IRj
y(t;￿) = E(yt+￿jF1
t ) ￿ E(yt+￿jF2
t ) ￿ = 1;2;::: (11)
When the coe¢ cients are constant, (11) collapses to the traditional impulse response
function to unitary structural shocks.
113 The data
The endogenous variables of the model are demeaned and standardized year-on-year
growth rates of output, industrial production, employment, consumption, investment and
prices for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, Finland, the UK, Den-
mark and Sweden for the period 1970Q1 to 2010Q4. Since the sample includes seven Euro
Area economies and the three most relevant countries which declined joining the zone, we
treat the latter as a control group in assessing the relevance and the scope of creation of the
ECB and the Euro changeover. Ideally, we would like to have a larger number of variables
in the model. Computational complexities and lack of availability of comparable variables
across countries for the full sample period limit the size of the system we consider. We
follow the practice of dating committees in both the US (NBER) and Europe (CEPR)
and simultaneously use output, industrial production, employment, consumption and in-
vestment in constructing our real indicators. Although the investigation is concerned with
real cycles, we use CPI in￿ ation to control for nominal factors and their feedback to real
variables, which could be potentially important to accurately measure the e⁄ects of the
monetary events of interest. The intensi￿cation of trade links over time is captured by an
exogenous variable since this trend is shared by all countries in the world.
Industrial production is measured by its index, employment by the total employment
index and prices by the CPI index, all of which are from OECD Main Economic Indica-
tors. Output is measured by real GDP, consumption by total real private consumption
expenditure and investment by real gross ￿xed capital formation. These three variables
are in 2000 prices and are from the OECD Economic Outlook database.
Variables are demeaned prior to the estimation since we are interested in ￿ uctuations
around some pivotal point rather than raw growth rates. While we demean by sample
averages, the results we present are broadly unchanged if a recursive mean is eliminated
from the variables. We standardize the variables, as in a factor model, so that variables
with higher volatility will not abnormally matter in constructing the indicators of interest.
Finally, year-on-year growth rates are selected as they are less a⁄ected than annualized
12quarter-on-quarter growth rates by temporary and idiosyncratic variations.
The exogenous variables we use are the growth rates of oil prices, of the world trade,
of US GDP, and the US nominal interest rate. Oil prices are quarterly average of daily
prices and come from the IMF International Financial Statistics; world trade is measured
by the total volume of world trade in goods and services in 2000 prices and is from
the OECD Main Economic Indicators. US GDP comes from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis - despite being reported as seasonally adjusted at the source, residual seasonality
was present and eliminated with TRAMO-SEATS. The US interest rate is the 3-month
nominal interbank rate and is obtained from the OECD Main Economic Indicators. We
use one lag of both the endogenous and exogenous variables. Hence, there are 60 equations
and the system has 60 ￿ (60 ￿ 1 + 4 ￿ 1) = 3840 coe¢ cients.
The sample is long enough to perform a number of statistical exercises to con￿rm that
our statistical model is su¢ ciently well speci￿ed. The relatively long sample size also
allows us to check whether statistical breaks in the properties of the series used in the
estimation exist and whether they occur in correspondence with the dates of institutional
changes. Unfortunately, as documented in the on-line appendix, standard break tests are
non-informative on this issue. While most series appear to display structural breaks in
their moments or their dynamic pro￿le, di⁄erent series within the same country display
breaks at di⁄erent dates, breaks are heterogeneously distributed across countries over time,
and do not appear to cluster around the dates when the institutional changes took place.
Thus, we use history and hindsight to choose the dates around which to focus our analysis.
The Maastricht Treaty was signed on February 7, 1992, but became e⁄ective only
on November 1st, 1993. Since there was considerable uncertainty regarding the actual
implementation of the treaty, we take 1993Q3 as our (conservative) cut-o⁄point. The ECB
creation occurred on June 1st, 1998, and the cut-o⁄ point is 1998Q3. Finally, the Euro
changeover occurred on January 1, 2002 and thus the cut-o⁄ point is 2002Q1. Moving
backward or forward the cut-o⁄ date by one year (or up to 1992Q1 in the case of the
Maastricht Treaty) does not a⁄ect any of the conclusions we present.
133.1 Some preliminary analysis
Before analyzing the questions of interest, it is useful to address some preliminary issues
concerning the speci￿cation of the model. The credibility of our conclusions will be en-
hanced if the model ￿ts the data well relative to alternatives, if the choice of continuous
time variations is supported in the data, and if our cyclical indicators reproduce important
features of the data. The model used in the next section was selected with a speci￿cation
search and di⁄erent models were compared using the marginal likelihood (ML) criteria.
The marginal likelihood of model Mi is f(Y jMi) =
R
L(yj￿i;Mi)g(￿ijMi)d￿i, where ￿i
is the vector of the parameters of Mi. Mi is preferable to Mi0 if the log Bayes factor
BF(Mi;Mi0) = log
f(Y jMi)
f(Y jMi0) substantially exceeds 10.
The benchmark speci￿cation, which features little (prior) time variation, unit-speci￿c
dynamics, one common real factor, one common nominal factor, and speci￿c factors for
the country, variable and exogenous components, has a log marginal likelihood (log ML =
-5188) which is higher than all the alternatives we considered. For example, a model with
one single common factor, pooling real and nominal variables, has log ML = -5221; a model
with higher prior time variation has log ML = -5340; a model with no country-speci￿c
dynamics has log ML = -5378; a model with no variable-speci￿c e⁄ects has log ML =
-5496; a model where there is no exogenous factor and the coe¢ cients on the exogenous
variables receive no special treatment has log ML = -5498.
We have also examined whether it is useful to separate Euro speci￿c from non-Euro
speci￿c real cycles in the common component. If the creation of the ECB or the Euro
changeover mattered di⁄erently for the two groups of countries, the data is likely to pre-
fer a speci￿cation where the two types of real cycles are distinct. It turns out that a
model with two separate sets of common real factors has a log ML = -5209. Thus, our
benchmark speci￿cation is greatly preferred with log Bayes factor of 21. To understand
why the statistical results are so decisively in favour of one common real factor, ￿gure
1 plots the posterior 68 percent tunnel for the common real indicator Z11t￿11t (labelled





11t (labelled ￿ common EMU￿and ￿ common non-EMU,￿
14respectively). Clearly, the ￿ uctuations in the two indicators are similar, highly in phase,
and very much synchronized with those present in the common indicator. Fluctuations in
the Euro indicator are less volatile than those in the non-Euro indicator up to the 1980s
and more volatile around 1990, but apart from these two periods di⁄erences are minor.
Thus, information is lost if the two areas are separated and this is re￿ ected in the fact
that the common real indicator is less volatile than each of two real regional indicators.
We have also examined whether our choice of continuous time variations in the coef-
￿cients characterizes the data better than one which has time variations just around the
dates when institutional changes took place. The log ML of the second model is -5237.
Thus, our benchmark speci￿cation is signi￿cantly preferred with log Bayes factor of 49.To
give a sense for why our continuous time varying speci￿cation is preferred, we have plot-
ted in ￿gure 2 rolling estimates of standard deviation, AR(1) coe¢ cient, contemporaneous
and maximum correlation for GDP and investment growth. Clearly, the idea that cyclical
￿ uctuations were stable except at the points where institutional breaks took place is not
supported in the data: time variations are continuous and generalized.
All in all, the model seems appropriate for the type of exercises we want to conduct
and statistically superior to the reasonable alternatives we have considered.
4 The results
To examine whether the institutional changes a⁄ected the properties of European real
cycles, we perform three exercises. First, we informally examine the dynamics of the
estimated common and country speci￿c indicators and compute reduced form statistics
around the dates of the events. Second, we conduct a forecasting exercise to detect whether
the institutional changes altered the pattern of cyclical ￿ uctuations above those that would
have been predictable using our time varying structure. Third, we compare the dynamic
responses of certain endogenous variables to two interesting shocks using the information
available before and after each of the events. These three exercises provide complementary
information on the issues of interest since they look at in-sample reduced form statistics,
out-of-sample pro￿les at interesting dates (in the same spirit as case studies), and in-
15sample conditional forecasting exercises. For future references, shaded areas in the ￿gures
capture recessions according to the CEPR classi￿cation (see www.cepr.org). Shaded areas
in the plots of national indicators, on the other hand, represent o¢ cial recessions phases
as reported by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI)(www.businesscyle.com);
these are absent from the plots for the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Finland since
no o¢ cial dating is available.
4.1 Some descriptive analysis
Our estimated indicators capture important features of European and national business
cycles. For example, ￿gure 1 shows that the time path of the (common) real indicator
shares important similarities with the synthetic Euro area GDP growth series, taken from
the ECB Area Wide Model database. They are highly contemporaneously correlated (the
maximum correlation is the contemporaneous one, with a coe¢ cient of 0.77) and show
similar serial correlation (around 0.9 in both cases). Euro area GDP is more volatile and
slightly leads our European real indicator in the last two decades but, by and large, they
have similar dynamic features - see on-line appendices for details.
The European common indicator of real activity has four strong recessions (1973-75,
1979-81, 1992-93, 2007-09) and a milder one (2001-2003). These dates are obtained feeding
the median estimate into a Bry and Boschan algorithm, and correspond almost exactly to
those reported by the CEPR. The business cycle phases of the national indicators shown
in ￿gure 3 are also well synchronized with those reported by ECRI. In fact, if we allow
for one quarter (two quarters) of maximum discrepancy, the average coincidence between
our dating and the ECRI dating is 63 (74) per cent.
The estimated European real indicator is characterized by di⁄erent phases. Until the
mid-1980s, ￿ uctuations were volatile and the series crossed the zero line often. Afterwards,
they were reduced, particularly after the early 1990s crisis. This low volatility phase ended
abruptly in 2008 and the ensuing recession is the largest in the sample. Thus, while a
￿European cycle￿is present throughout the period, it is only since the mid-1980s that it
acquires typical persistence and duration features. The estimated national indicators (see
16￿gure 3), instead, display typical cyclical features throughout the sample. As intuition
would suggest, these indicators are quite heterogeneous in terms of timing, amplitude and
duration of the ￿ uctuations. However, the characteristics of indicators of major countries
become more similar as time goes by, and in the last recession, their coincidence reached
a historical maximum. The ups and downs in the national indicators also become more
correlated with those of the common real indicator as time progresses.
As ￿gure 4 shows, recursive estimates of the volatilities of the European and the
national indicators fall in the late 1980s, and there is some rebounding in the early 1990s
(due to German reuni￿cation, the ￿nancial crises in the Nordic countries and the European
Monetary System crisis). The fall becomes more marked up to 2008, when volatilities
reached unprecedented levels. The initial declining trend is in line with the reduction in
the real business cycle volatility documented, e.g., in Stock and Watson (2003). However,
rather than happening in the early 1980s, the volatility reduction takes place in the late
1980s and in the 2000s and is therefore distinct from the Great Moderation phenomena.
Since this is the period when in￿ ation returned to low levels, this evidence suggests a
generic process of cyclical convergence for the whole of Europe.
Despite these variations, the length of business cycles phases in both the real common
and the national indicators is roughly invariant over time. For example, recessions in the
European real indicator last on average 7 quarters. The length of recessions in the national
indicators is somewhat heterogeneous, is on average of 6 quarters while individual country
averages range from 5 to 8 quarters.
The time variations we highlighted square reasonably well with what is known in the
literature. For example, in line with Canova et al. (2007), the strengthening of a common
cyclical pattern does not imply that national cycles are disappearing. In fact, the stronger
cyclicality displayed by the European real indicator is not the result of an increase in
the synchronization across countries ￿the maximum correlation between the European
and the national indicators was almost always contemporaneous (see ￿gure 4). Instead, it
comes from more intense comovements across countries ￿the contemporaneous correlation
of almost all national indicators with the European indicator increases over time.
174.2 Institutional changes and real ￿ uctuations
Artis and Zhang (1997) analyzed business cycles statistics in Europe for the period up
to 1979 and for the 1979-91 period ￿the period of the ￿rst European Monetary System
(EMS). They found an increase in the degree of conformity and of synchronization in the
￿ uctuations of the countries participating to the ￿rst monetary system, an increase which
was not present in non-EMS countries. Figure 4 seems to suggest the contrary. Changes in
the volatility and the persistence of the European real indicator and the national indicators
in the post ECB and post-Euro samples are di¢ cult to detect, but when they are present
they are shared by Euro and non-Euro area countries.
One may argue that the decision to give up monetary policy and join the Euro was
not entirely political and that countries endogenously selected into Euro and non-Euro
members based on the similarities of their cyclical ￿ uctuations. Since cyclical ￿ uctuations
and their changes in the two areas are quite alike, this possibility is quite remote.
We can think of at least three reasons for why our conclusions di⁄er from those of
Artis and Zhang. First, the 1970s were fundamentally di⁄erent from the 1990s and 2000s,
at least in terms of in￿ ation movements and real- monetary interactions. Second, Artis
and Zhang did not allow for time variations nor for cross country heterogeneous feedbacks
in their analysis. Third, they focus on GDP data, while our indicators are constructed
using a much broader set of macroeconomic data. To understand which of the di⁄erence
could explain the opposite conclusions, we have in turn, estimated the model up to 1991;
eliminated cross country feedbacks and time variations; used only GDP data in the model.
It turns out that lack of time variations is the ingredient that makes results di⁄erent: if
we omit them from the model, we roughly recover Artis and Zhang￿ s conclusion.
Figure 4 is more consistent with the view that the Maastricht treaty was important.
In fact, all the statistics we present are di⁄erent in the pre and post-Maastricht samples;
the contemporaneous correlation of the national and the European indicator increases
substantially in all cases, and the maximum correlation moves from lagged to contempo-
raneous. But is the Maastricht treaty responsible for these changes? Closer inspection
shows that most of the changes predate the implementation of the Treaty and start taking
18place in the mid-1980. European and the national indicators are, in fact, highly correlated
and cyclical ￿ uctuations have become more synchronized in all countries at that time. The
time gap is not necessarily inconsistent with the Maastricht treaty mattering: long an-
ticipatory e⁄ects may be present when events are known in advance (see Bruckner and
Pappa, 2011). However, the uncertainty surrounding the process that led to the signing
of the Treaty, makes it di¢ cult to believe that such anticipatory e⁄ects could credibly
appear up to eight years before the Treaty was ￿nally implemented.
In sum, European cyclical ￿ uctuations change over time and the changes go in the
direction of making national cycles more similar and more synchronous with the European
cycle. The changes start taking place in the middle of the 1980s and the process appears
to terminate in the middle of the 1990s. Thus, both the timing and the nature of the
changes provide, prima facie, evidence against the idea that the creation of the ECB and
the Euro changeover generated major variations in European business cycles. For the
Maastricht treaty, conclusions are less clear cut but, even in this case, the association
between changes in business cycle statistic and institutional changes is weak.
4.3 Out-of-sample predictions
To acquire more evidence on the e⁄ects that institutional changes had on cyclical ￿ uctu-
ations, we now turn to an out-of-sample unconditional forecasting exercise. The idea is
simple: we want to see how bad our model is in forecasting the endogenous variables at
the times when the events took place. If we can reasonably predict the time path of real
series and if this is true for various forecasting horizons, then the institutional events of
interest do not produce variations in the structure of business ￿ uctuations in addition to
those already built-in into the structure of the model.
We forecast the six endogenous variables of each country using the information avail-
able prior to the Maastricht treaty, the creation of the ECB and the Euro changeover. In
particular, given the information available at 1993Q3, 1998Q3 and 2002Q1, we compute
out-of-sample predictive distributions up to 6 quarters ahead. We then check whether
the actual path of the variables falls within the 90 percent predictive tunnel. If it does
19not, institutional changes matter, at least in a forecasting sense. To save space, and given
that results do not depend on the chosen variable, we report in ￿gure 5 the predictive
distributions for GDP growth only.
The forecasting outcomes depend on the event. While for most countries no forecast is
outside the credible tunnel for more than a quarter, after the Euro changeover, the actual
GDP growth path is outside the credible tunnel repeatedly over the forecasting horizon
after the creation of the ECB for UK, Sweden, France, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands.
Since the model consistently underestimate GDP growth of these six countries while it is
better for Germany, Italy, Denmark and Finland, national idiosyncrasies, rather than the
creation of the ECB, could be responsible for the deviations we observe.
The forecasts performed around the date of the implementation of the Maastricht
treaty are less accurate and for most countries actual GDP growth is outside of the 90
percent tunnel more than once over the forecasting horizon. There is however a pattern
in the deviations in France, Germany, and to a lesser extent Belgium: forecasts tend to be
more optimistic than the realized values over the ￿rst 2 quarters and more pessimistic over
the last two quarters, perhaps as a result of the uncertainty concerning the consequences
of the implementation of the Maastricht treaty. If forecasts were performed in 1992Q1
(the date when the Treaty was signed) the results are slightly better indicating that the
uncertainty present in 1993Q4 was indeed an important factor.
As mentioned, the fact that we have three countries outside the Euro area, allows to
compare the forecasts against an important benchmark. If the quality of the forecasts dif-
fers in the two groups of countries after the creation of the ECB and the Euro changeover,
we can provide stronger evidence that these two institutional events had e⁄ects on the
characteristics of real business cycles in Europe. Figure 5 indicates that this is not the
case. Since this conclusion is insensitive to the dates we choose to forecast ￿for example,
if we anticipate the forecasting dates by up to 4 quarters, the performance of the model is
hardly a⁄ected ￿the creation of the ECB and the introduction of the Euro did not have
any additional e⁄ect on European real business over and above those that time variations
in the model would have predicted.
20It is possible that our forecasting exercises are not very powerful, especially if institu-
tional changes have slow and delayed e⁄ects. While this is a valid argument for forecasts
computed at short horizons, an earlier version of the paper showed that the conclusions
are broadly maintained if forecasts are extended up to 5 years ahead. Thus, it is unlikely
that lack of power is the reason for why our forecasting tests fail to recognize the creation
of the ECB and the Euro changeover as major factors for European business cycles.
4.4 The transmission of shocks
Unconditional forecasting exercises are a useful benchmark but by their very same nature,
they are not particularly informative about variations in the transmission of certain types
of shocks. An unchanged unconditional forecasting performance could in fact be consistent
with institutional changes mattering as long as the changes in the dynamic responses
approximately average out across shocks.
To gather additional information, we therefore examine the transmission of two partic-
ular shocks. We consider both a ￿local￿disturbance ￿a temporary German GDP growth
shock ￿and an ￿external￿shock ￿a temporary increase in the growth rate of US GDP.
These two shocks are interesting because they provide information about nature of the
intraeuropean and transatlantic transmission of disturbances, the magnitude of the syn-
chronization and the signi￿cance of the heterogeneities present in the cyclical component
of European countries. Once again, given the large number of variables in the system,
we need to select which responses to report. Following the literature, we presents the
responses of GDP growth to a German GDP growth shock (￿gure 6) and to a US GDP
growth shock (￿gure 7) at 1993Q3, 1998Q3 and 2002Q1. We also present responses at
2007Q3, the commonly accepted starting point of the global ￿nancial crisis.
There are some changes in the transmission of a German growth shock over time, but
they primarily involve the magnitude of the responses rather than the sign or the shape.
A one standard error shock in the growth rate of German GDP has important spillovers
on the GDP growth of other countries prior to Maastricht and, in half of the countries,
the contemporaneous responses is up to 50 percent larger than in Germany. Spillovers
21remain important in the period between Maastricht and the creation of the ECB, but
now the largest contemporaneous responses (occurring in the UK and Belgium) are only
35-40 larger than those in Germany. Spillovers uniformly increase after the creation of the
ECB ￿now all nine countries responses are larger than the German GDP response ￿and
excluding Finland, they remain roughly similar until the end of the sample. Interestingly,
the idea that Germany has been the ￿locomotive￿ for growth in Europe has not been
much a⁄ected by the three institutional changes of interest but its role has strengthened
in the last decade. Note that spillovers are equally strong in Euro and non-Euro area
countries and their relative importance has not changed much over time. Finally, since
the largest spillovers have been always contemporaneous and the decay back to the steady
state is similar, the timing of transmission of German growth shocks and the duration of
the e⁄ects has not changed much over the last 20 years.
There has been considerable variation in the transmission of US growth shocks on
European GDP growth. Before Maastricht transmission was weak and somewhat delayed;
the magnitude and the persistence of responses increased in magnitude after Maastricht,
and the peak response of GDP growth in Europe seem to lag by about two years the
initial impulse. Responses become much smaller in the period between the creation of the
ECB and the Euro changeover. Finally, at the end of the sample, the responses become
again larger and heterogeneities more evident. Overall, a positive US GDP growth is
expansionary in Europe; and the magnitude of the e⁄ect is not large, but quite persistent.
Once again, neither the sign nor the shape of the responses have changed much over the
last 20 years and the pattern is shared by both Euro area and non-Euro area countries.
Thus, the Maastricht treaty, the creation of the ECB and the Euro changeover have not
a⁄ected much the features of the transatlantic transmission of real shocks: there has been
an intensi￿cation of the links, but not much else.
5 Conclusions
This paper examines the e⁄ect that institutional changes have on the dynamics of business
cycles by focusing on the recent European experience and three events occurred in the last
2220 years: the Maastricht treaty, the creation of the ECB and the Euro changeover. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the ￿rst to investigate the relationship between institutional
changes and business cycles. The recent sovereign debt crises has triggered expectations
of further changes in European institutions and our analysis can help to predict how
European business cycles will shape after the expected changes in Governance.
To study the questions of interest a panel VAR model is estimated using quarterly
data for six variables in ten European countries, seven which adopted the Euro and three
which did not ￿the latter is used as control group. We document the time evolution of
European and national cyclical ￿ uctuations; report reduced form statistics characterizing
their features over time; conduct an out-of-sample forecasting exercise and trace out the
dynamics of the endogenous variables in response to shocks at di⁄erent dates.
The features of European and national cycles have changed over time: we detect impor-
tant variations in the volatility, and a higher conformity between national and European
￿ uctuations as time goes by. These variations, however, predate the events of interest,
are shared by both Euro area and non-Euro area countries, and appear to be linked to a
general process of convergence and synchronization taking place in Europe in the 1980-90s.
Our model can predict well output growth ￿ uctuations after the creation of the ECB and
the Euro changeover. We discover changes in the intensity of the transmission of certain
disturbances, but the propagation pro￿le is largely una⁄ected to the events of interest.
Thus, while the creation of the ECB and the Euro changeover are not major events
for European real business cycles, one may have some doubts about the consequences
of the Maastricht Treaty. We have argued that it is di¢ cult to appeal to the potential
predictability of the event to account for the changes which began to take place in the
mid-1980s, especially taking into account that there was considerable uncertainty about
the feasibility of the treaty. Nevertheless, one has to admit that little is known about the
empirical consequences of predictable institutional changes.
The evidence we present has important implications for the literature concerned with
common currency areas, the e⁄ects of large monetary events, the e⁄ects of national idio-
syncrasies and the relationship between business and medium term cycles. The process
23of real convergence we discover predates the three institutional changes we consider; large
monetary events had minor e⁄ects on both the nature and the structure of real ￿ uctua-
tions; national idiosyncrasies matter less but they are not fading away; and business cycles
are more similar across countries but not necessarily more related to those medium term
￿ uctuations, which is now fashionable to study (see Gertler and Comin, 2006). Both aca-
demic and policymakers should pay attention to these results since they depart somewhat
from what the conventional wisdom likes to stress.
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26Figure 1. Common real European indicators and GDP growth
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3Figure 2. Recursive statistics of selected variables
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1.00Figure 3. Country specific indicators
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1.0Figure 5: Out-of-Sample forecast of GDP growth
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2.0Figure 6. Responses of GDP growth to one standard error increase in German real activity
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1.6Figure 7. Responses of GDP growth to one standard error increase in US GDP growth
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0.05COMMON UK DK SW DE FR IT SP BE NL FI EMU GDP
S.D. 0.14 0.27 0.29 0.34 0.17 0.25 0.34 0.29 0.28 0.15 0.31 1.88
AR(1) 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.92 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.89 0.80 0.91 0.95
Corr (lag) 0.80 (0) 0.80 (0) 0.74 (0) 0.64 (0) 0.69 (0) 0.47 (-1) 0.72 (0) 0.62 (0) 0.62 (-1) 0.65 (0) 0.77 (0)
corr at 0 0.41 0.59
S.D. 0.10 0.29 0.28 0.33 0.14 0.25 0.34 0.27 0.30 0.15 0.34 1.82
AR(1) 0.88 0.86 0.89 0.97 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.72 0.93 0.95
Max corr 0.77 (0) 0.75 (0) 0.55 (-1) 0.51 (0) 0.61 (-1) 0.52 (-2) 0.57 (-2) 0.65 (-1) 0.46 (-1) 0.45 0.71
corr at 0 0.54 0.51 0.58 0.25 0.48 0.57 0.41
S.D. 0.18 0.24 0.31 0.35 0.17 0.25 0.23 0.32 0.23 0.15 0.27 1.88
AR(1) 0.90 0.93 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.90 0.92 0.95 0.83 0.90 0.88 0.95
Max corr 0.96 (0) 0.91 (0) 0.93 (0) 0.84 (0) 0.89 (0) 0.93 (0) 0.92 (0) 0.83 (0) 0.81 (-1) 0.94 (0) 0.94 (1)
corr at 0 0.80 0.82
S.D. 0.20 0.26 0.31 0.40 0.20 0.28 0.26 0.37 0.26 0.15 0.29 2.15
AR(1) 0.90 0.92 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.86 0.91 0.89 0.94
Max corr 0.97 (0) 0.94 (0) 0.97 (0) 0.85 (0) 0.94 (0) 0.95 (0) 0.94 (0) 0.85 (0) 0.81 (-1) 0.96 (0) 0.95 (1)
corr at 0 0.80 0.83
S.D. 0.22 0.28 0.36 0.44 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.40 0.28 0.15 0.32 2.30
AR(1) 0.91 0.92 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.86 0.93 0.89 0.92
Max corr 0.98 (0) 0.94 (0) 0.97 (0) 0.85 (0) 0.96 (0) 0.97 (0) 0.94 (0) 0.91 (0) 0.86 (-1) 0.97 (0) 0.96 (1)
corr at 0 0.85 0.82
Table A1. Reduced form statistics of real indicators
S.D. is the standard deviation; AR(1) the first autoregressive coefficient; Corr(lag) the largest correlation with the common cycle indicator and the lag at 




Post ECB creation: 1998Q3-2010Q4
Post Euro changeover: 2002Q1-2010Q4Period Peak or Trough COMMON UK DK SW DE FR IT SP BE NL FI
P
T 71Q3 71Q3 71Q3 71Q3
P 72Q4 72Q4 72Q4 72Q4 72Q1
T 73Q4 72Q1
P 74Q4 74Q1 73Q1 73Q4 73Q2 73Q3 73Q2
T 74Q3 75Q2 74Q3 75Q1 75Q2 75Q1 75Q2 75Q2 75Q2 75Q2
P 76Q2 76Q3 76Q1 76Q1 76Q2 76Q2 76Q3 76Q2 76Q2 76Q2
T 77Q2 77Q3 77Q1 77Q3 77Q4 77Q3 77Q3 78Q4 77Q2 77Q2 77Q3
P 79Q1 79Q1 79Q2 79Q2 79Q4 78Q3 79Q4 79Q4 79Q4 78Q2
T 80Q4 80Q4 80Q4 81Q2 80Q4 80Q4 80Q4 81Q2 78Q4
P 82Q3 82Q3 82Q1 81Q2 82Q1 82Q4 82Q2 79Q4 80Q2
T 83Q1 83Q1 83Q1 82Q2 83Q1 82Q4 83Q1 81Q3 81Q2
P 84Q1 83Q4 84Q3 83Q3 83Q4 83Q4 82Q3
T 84Q4 84Q3 84Q1 84Q3 84Q1 83Q3
P 85Q2 85Q1 85Q3 85Q4 85Q3 85Q1
T 85Q4 86Q1 86Q4 86Q3 86Q4 86Q3 85Q4 86Q1
P 86Q1 86Q1 86Q2
T 87Q3 87Q2
P 87Q4 87Q3 87Q2
T 88Q2 88Q3
P 88Q3 88Q4 88Q4 88Q3 88Q2 89Q1
T 89Q1 90Q1
P 90Q3 90Q1 89Q1 90Q3 89Q1
T 91Q1 91Q1 90Q4 91Q2 90Q3 91Q3 91Q2 91Q3
P 92Q1 91Q4 91Q4 91Q2 92Q1 91Q4
T 93Q1 93Q2 92Q2 92Q4 93Q1 93Q1 92Q4 93Q1 93Q3
P 94Q3 94Q2 94Q3 95Q1 94Q3 94Q4 94Q4 94Q4 95Q2 94Q3 95Q1
T 95Q3 95Q4 96Q3 95Q4 96Q4 96Q3 95Q4 96Q2 95Q2 96Q1
P 97Q4 97Q3 97Q4 97Q3 97Q2 96Q2 97Q3
T 96Q3 98Q4 98Q4 97Q3
P 98Q2 98Q4 98Q1
T 99Q2 99Q1 99Q2 99Q2 99Q1 99Q1 99Q2
P 00Q1 99Q4 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1 99Q4 00Q3 99Q4 00Q1 99Q3 00Q3
T 01Q3 01Q1 01Q3 01Q4 01Q3 01Q4 01Q3 00Q3 01Q4
P 02Q3 02Q1 02Q3 02Q3 01Q1
T 03Q1 03Q2 03Q1 02Q1 03Q2 03Q2 00Q1
P 04Q1 04Q1 04Q2 04Q4 04Q1 04Q2 04Q2 04Q3
T 04Q4 05Q1 04Q4 05Q3 04Q4 06Q1 04Q4 05Q1
P 06Q3 06Q4 05Q4 06Q4 06Q3 06Q1 05Q4 06Q4 05Q4
T 07Q1 06Q2
P 08Q1 07Q2 07Q3 07Q1
T 09Q1 09Q1 09Q1 09Q1 08Q4 08Q4 09Q1 09Q1 09Q1 09Q1 09Q1
83% 60% 54% 67% 58% 57%
92% 64% 75% 86% 61% 65%



































1976:02 1977:02 14 7 11 4
1979:01 1980:04 11 7 14 7
1982:03 1983:01 14 7 9 2
1984:01 1984:04 6473
1986:01 1991:01 8 5 25 20
1992:01 1993:01 24 4 8 4
1994:03 1996:03 10 6 14 8
1998:02 1999:02 15 7 11 4
2000:01 2003:01 7 3 15 12
2004:01 2004:04 16 4 7 3











1972:04 1973:04 5 9 4
1974:04 1975:02 8462
1976:03 1977:03 7594
1979:01 1980:04 10 6 13 7
1983:04 1984:03 19 12 15 3
1985:02 1985:04 6352
1987:04 1991:01 10 8 21 13
1994:02 1995:03 26 13 18 5
1997:04 1999:01 14 9 14 5
1999:04 2001:03 8 3 10 7
2002:03 2003:02 11 4 7 3
2004:01 2005:01 6374











1976:01 1977:01 13 6 10 4
1979:02 1980:04 13 9 15 6
1982:03 1983:01 13 7 9 2
1986:01 1987:03 14 12 18 6
1988:03 1990:04 10 4 13 9
1991:04 1993:02 13 4 10 6
1994:03 1995:04 11 5 10 5
1997:03 1999:02 12 7 14 7





Table A2-1. Growth rate cycle turning points. Full 













1973:04 1975:01 7 12 5
1976:02 1977:03 10 5 10 5
1979:04 1982:04 14 9 21 12
1983:04 1984:03 16 4 7 3
1985:04 1986:04 8594
1988:03 1989:01 11 7 9 2
1990:01 1990:03 6462
1991:02 1993:01 5 3 10 7
1994:04 1996:03 14 7 14 7
1997:03 1998:04 11 4 9 5
2000:03 2001:03 12 7 11 4
2002:03 2003:02 8473
2004:01 2004:04 6363











1973:03 1975:02 8 15 7
1976:02 1977:02 11 4 8 4
1978:02 1978:04 8462
1979:04 1981:03 6 4 11 7
1983:04 1985:04 16 9 17 8
1986:02 1987:02 10 2 6 4
1989:01 1990:01 11 7 11 4
1990:03 1991:02 6253
1991:04 1993:03 5297
1994:03 1995:02 11 4 7 3
1996:02 1997:03 7495
1999:03 2000:03 13 8 12 4
2001:01 2003:01 6 2 10 8
2004:02 2004:04 13 5 7 2
2005:04 2006:02 6462











1979:02 1981:02 21 7 15 8
1982:01 1983:01 11 3 7 4
1984:03 1986:01 10 6 12 6
1987:03 1988:02 12 6 9 3
1988:04 1992:04 5 2 18 16
1995:01 1996:03 25 9 15 6
1998:04 1999:02 15 9 11 2
2000:01 2001:03 5396











1972:04 1975:01 5 14 9
1976:01 1977:04 13 4 11 7
1979:04 1980:04 15 8 12 4
1981:02 1982:02 6264
1983:03 1984:01 9572
1985:01 1986:04 6 4 11 7
1990:03 1992:04 22 15 24 9
1994:03 1995:04 16 7 12 5
1997:04 1998:04 13 8 12 4
2000:01 2002:01 9 5 13 8














1976:02 1977:03 13 4 9 5
1978:03 1980:04 9 4 13 9
1982:01 1983:01 14 5 9 4
1985:03 1986:03 14 10 14 4
1988:04 1991:02 13 9 19 10
1991:04 1993:01 12 2 7 5
1994:04 1996:04 12 7 15 8
1998:01 1999:01 13 5 9 4
1999:04 2001:04 7 3 11 8
2002:03 2003:02 11 3 6 3
2004:04 2005:03 9693











1976:03 1978:04 18 5 14 9
1979:04 1980:04 13 4 8 4
1982:04 1984:01 12 8 13 5
1987:02 1988:03 18 13 18 5
1989:01 1992:04 7 2 17 15
1994:04 1995:04 23 8 12 4
1999:04 2001:04 20 16 24 8











1976:02 1977:02 12 4 8 4
1979:04 1981:02 14 10 16 6
1982:02 1983:01 10 4 7 3
1985:03 1986:03 13 10 14 4
1988:02 1991:03 11 7 20 13
1992:01 1993:01 15 2 6 4
1995:02 1996:02 13 9 13 4
1997:02 1999:01 8 4 11 7
2000:01 2001:03 11 4 10 6
2004:02 2006:01 17 11 18 7











1973:02 1975:02 7 15 8
1976:02 1977:03 12 4 9 5
1980:02 1981:02 16 11 15 4
1982:03 1983:03 9594
1985:01 1986:01 10 6 10 4
1989:01 1991:03 16 12 22 10
1995:01 1996:01 24 14 18 4
1997:03 1999:02 10 6 13 7
2000:03 2001:04 12 5 10 5
2004:03 2005:01 16 11 13 2





BIC  LWZ 1970s 1980s 1990s first 2000s second 2000s
GDP 2 0
1975:04           
(1971:02   1976:01)
1979:04           
(1979:01   1982:02)
Employment 2 1
1974:04        
(1974:03   1975:03)
  1993:01           
(1988:02   1993:04)
Ind. Prod. 1 0
1974:04        
(1971:04   1979:01)
Consumption 2 0
1979:02        
(1978:02   1981:03)
  1983:01          
(1982:03   1984:02)
Investment 0 0
CPI 2 1
1975:02        
(1975:01   1985:02)
  1981:02          
(1982:01   1983:01)
GDP 2 1
1991:01          
(1990:01   1991:02)
   2007:01           
(2004:01   2010:04)
Employment 3 0
1987:02        
(1986:03   1987:04)
  1993:04           
(1992:02   1994:03)
  2002:02           
(2000:02   2003:03)
Ind. Prod. 2 0
1987:02        
(1983:01   1993:01)
  1999:04           
(1996:04   2001:02)
Consumption 4 1
1990:04        
(1987:04   1991:02)
  1997:02           
(1994:04   2002:03)
  2003:03           
(2001:04   2004:01)
   2007:02           
(2006:04   2007:04)
Investment 3 1
1989:04        
(1989:02   1990:01)
  1993:03           
(1992:04   1998:02)
   2007:01           
(2003:03   2010:01)
CPI 3 1
1975:04        
(1974:01   1976:04)
  1982:04          
(1982:03   1983:04)
  1989:04           
(1989:01   1990:04)
GDP 2 0
1993:01          
(1992:02   1994:01)
   2007:02           
(2006:01   2010:04)
Employment 2 0
1989:03        
(1989:02   1991:03)
  1993:02           
(1991:03   1993:04)
Ind. Prod. 1 1
1988:04        
(1981:04   1990:01)
Consumption 1 1
  1993:01           
(1992:02   1995:04)
Investment 3 1
  1993:01           
(1992:04   1994:03)
  2000:03           
(1998:01   2000:04)
   2004:02           
(2004:01   2004:04)
CPI 1 1
1991:02          
(1990:03   1993:01)
GDP 2 0
1982:04        
(1982:01   1984:02)
  1987:02           
(1985:03   1988:02)
Employment 3 0
1985:01        
(1984:03   1985:02)
  1989:04           
(1989:02   1990:04)
   2004:01           
(1998:04   2006:02)
Ind. Prod. 0 0
Consumption 3 0
1979:01        
(1978:03   1979:04)
  1982:04          
(1981:03   1983:02)
  1993:01           
(1992:01   1995:01)
Investment 0 0
CPI 1 1
1982:03        
(1981:04   1985:04)
GDP 0 0
Employment 0 0
Ind. Prod. 0 0
Consumption 1 0
1974:02        
(1974:01   1975:02)
Investment 0 0
CPI 1 1
1985:02        






Table A3. Test for multiple unknown structural breaks





  1993:02           
(1992:01   2005:01)
Ind. Prod. 1 1
1974:03        
(1971:03   1977:02)
Consumption 0 0
1974:04        
(1974:03   1975:03)
  1993:01           
(1988:02   1993:04)
Investment 2 0
1974:03        
(1974:02   1976:03)
  1979:04          
(1979:03   1981:03)
CPI 2 0
1974:04        
(1972:04   1975:01)
  1982:04          
(1982:03   1989:03)
GDP 3 0
1980:03        
(1980:02   1980:04)
1986:04        
(1983:04   1987:02)
  1991:01           
(1990:03   1994:01)
Employment 1 0
1974:02       
(1974:01   1975:03)
Ind. Prod. 2 0
1974:03        
(1972:04   1976:01)
  1992:01           
(1989:04   1993:02)
Consumption 1 0
1980:04        
(1978:04   1981:02)
Investment 2 0
  1994:01           
(1991:01   1994:04)
   2007:02           
(2006:04   2008:04)
CPI 1 1
  1986:01          
(1985:03   1987:03)
GDP 1 0
  1994:01           
(1980:02   1995:04)
Employment 2 1
  1998:04           
(1998:01   1999:01)
  2003:03           
(2000:03   2010:04)
Ind. Prod. 1 0
1974:04        
(1974:03   1975:03)
  1993:01           
(1988:02   1993:04)
   2007:01           
(2003:01  2010:04)
Consumption 3 1
  1995:01           
(1994:04   1995:03)
  2000:04           
(1999:02   2001:04)
   2005:01           
(2004:03  2006:02)
Investment 3 1
  1996:01           
(1995:02   1996:04)
  2002:03           
(2001:02   2010:04)
   2007:02           
(2006:03  2008:03)
CPI 2 1
1974:03        
(1974:01  1976:03)
  1985:02          
(1983:01   1985:03)
GDP 1 0
1979:02        
(1973:02   1991:04)
Employment 2 0
  1999:04           
(1991:03   2000:01)
   2005:02           
(2004:02  2010:04)
Ind. Prod. 0 0
Consumption 3 0
1978:03        
(1978:01   1979:03)
  1982:03          
(1981:02   1984:01)
  1995:02           
(1993:01   2000:04)
Investment 1 0
1979:02        
(1979:01   2000:03)
CPI 2 1
1974:03        
(1974:01   1975:03)
  1987:02          
(1984:04   1987:04)
GDP 1 1
  1987:04          
(1985:02   1993:04)
Employment 1 0
  1989:04          
(1985:03   1994:04)
Ind. Prod. 1 1
  1990:02           
(1986:03   1994:04)
Consumption 1 1
1976:01        
(1973:04   1978:04)
Investment 1 1
1975:03        
(1972:04   1977:04)
CPI 2 0
1982:02        
(1981:01   1983:03)
  1991:01           
(1990:01   1993:04)
World trade 1 0
1974:02        
(1969:04   1976:03)
Oil price 1 0
1974:02        
(1973:03   1982:02)
US GDP 0 0
1974:04        
(1974:03   1975:03)
  1993:01           
(1988:02   1993:04)
US FFR 2 0
1978:04        
(1977:03   1979:03)
  1982:03          
(1982:02   1985:01)
average 1.5 0.4
IT
Tests are based on the procedure by Bai and Perron, JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMETRICS 18: 1–22 (2003).  BIC: Bayesian 























































































































































3.0Figure 7a. Responses of GDP growth to one standard error increase in US GDP growth
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